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The Unitary Patent Package, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Brexit: 
(Ir)reconcilable? 
 
Karen Walsh1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For almost seventy years, debates in the European patent community have centred on the introduction 
of a unitary patent system, be it for the European Union (EU) or more inclusive. For an efficient and 
effective European patent system, there are two key aspects to consider – the promotion of 
harmonisation and the consideration of wider societal implications. The Unitary Patent Package (UPP) 
could be the first successful implementation of a unitary system. However, even if it only ends up 
being a chapter in the quest for unitary patent protection, there are major lessons we can learn from 
this attempt at harmonising the European patent system.  
In considering these two key aspects, this article focuses on the role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) in the UPP and the added complication of Brexit. In doing so, it examines 
the relevant institutional issues that have arisen in the lead up to the finalisation of the UPP, which 
continue to cause issues as a result of the United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to leave the EU, and 
proposes a new way forward for the reconciliation of the UPP, the CJEU, and Brexit. It is argued that 
the continued questioning of the role of the CJEU goes against the overarching goal of a harmonised 
patent system that still considers the wider implications of its decisions. 
The make-up of the UPP is unique. It consists of two EU Regulations: one creating the unitary 
patent and another implementing a new translation arrangement. The third and final element of the 
UPP is the international (non-EU) Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), which will introduce 
a Unified Patent Court (UPC). One of the most unique aspects of this package is the EU nature of the 
unitary patent coupled with the jurisdiction of a non-EU court.  
In the lead up to the finalisation of the UPP, great strides were taken by EU Member States in 
an attempt to restrict the CJEU from interpreting provisions of substantive patent law. However, 
questions remain as to the level of involvement the CJEU could and should have in substantive patent 
law and the UPP. This will have a major impact on how the patent system in Europe progresses and 
whether that progress will be at the expense of broader societal concerns. This question has added 
significance given the UK’s decision to ratify the UPCA despite its imminent departure from the EU.  
Much has been written about the UPP and some recent articles have discussed the question of 
the continued participation of the UK in the UPP post-Brexit.2 Legally, there have been strong 
arguments on either side as to whether the UK can and should remain a part of the proposed unitary 
patent system after leaving the EU. However, this article takes a new approach by focussing solely on 
                                                        
1 Lecturer, Law School, University of Exeter. The author would like to thank Stefan Luginbuehl, Dr Naomi Hawkins, Dr 
Mathilde Pavis, Dr Bríd Ní Ghráinne, and Professor Andrea Lista for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and 
Dr Justine Pila for her support and insight. 
2 See: Richard Gordon QC and Tom Pascoe, ‘Re The Effect of “Brexit” on the Unitary Patent Regulation and The Unified 
Patent Court Agreement’ [2016] 
<http://www.bristowsupc.com/assets/files/counsel_s%20opinion%20on%20effect%20of%20brexit%20on%20upc,%201
2%20sept%202016.pdf> accessed 27 September 2018; Winfried Tilmann, ‘The future of the UPC after Brexit’ (2016) 
available at: < http://www.theunitarypatent.com/the-unitary-patent-regulation-and-upc-agreement-after-brexit> accessed 
27 September 2018; Ansgar Ohly and Rudolf Streinz, ‘Can the UK stay in the UPC system after Brexit?’ (2017) 12(3) 
JIPLP 245; Thomas Jaeger, ‘Reset and Go: The Unitary Patent System Post-Brexit’ (2016) SSRN Discussion Paper; María 
Aránzazu Gandía Sellens, ‘The Viability of the Unitary Patent Package After the UK’s Ratification of the Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court’ (2018) 49 IIC 136; and Aisling McMahon, ‘Brexit and the Unitary Patent Package: A Further 
Compromised Future?’ (2018) 15(2) Scripted 175. 
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the continually threatened role of the CJEU in the UPP  despite having shaped its form, how Brexit 
has added to that and its implications for a harmonised European patent system.  
It begins with a summary of the main provisions of the UPP, followed by a review of the 
negotiations that led up to the final iteration of the UPP. One of the most significant aspects of this 
period, and something that has not been explicitly mentioned in literature thus far, is the contrast 
between the role of the CJEU in shaping the UPP and the attempts that were then made by EU Member 
States to limit the role of the CJEU in the interpretation of the UPP.  
By investigating the reasons behind these attempts, this article illustrates that there is a level of 
distrust when it comes to the CJEU, especially from the UK, but also among stakeholders in the patent 
community. Through an analysis of key decisions by the CJEU in relation to supplementary protection 
certificates and biotechnological inventions, it is found that there is a valid reason for this scepticism, 
but the author argues that this is not sufficient reason to limit its role in patent law or in the UPP. It is 
argued that the CJEU should retain a key role over patent law in Europe given its generalist nature and 
consideration of wider societal concerns. Furthermore, the attempts that were made were not 
successful. Therefore, it is concluded that the CJEU will likely have a significant role in the UPP. 
Another major complicating factor surrounding these debates is the decision of the UK 
government to leave the EU. Although previous attempts to limit the role of the CJEU have failed, 
Brexit may have that intended impact for the UK in a post-EU future, which goes against the purpose 
of a harmonised system.  
The article will therefore also analyse the continued participation of the UK in the UPP 
following Brexit and the future role of the CJEU. Given the UK’s staunch objection to the involvement 
of the CJEU versus their wanting to remain part of the unitary patent system,3 a key question arises as 
to whether the UK would be bound by CJEU judgments on the unitary patent system if it remains in 
that system, but outside the EU, and if that would be acceptable.  
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the issue and calls to use this opportunity to re-draft a more 
inclusive unitary patent system, this paper argues a new way forward for the reconciliation of the UPP, 
the CJEU and Brexit by soft harmonisation through persuasive authority – that in any scenario, 
decisions of relevant courts, including the CJEU, can and should be taken into account. It is argued 
that despite attempts to limit the role of the CJEU and the added complication of Brexit, it will and 
still should have a role in the interpretation of substantive patent law, the UPP, and furthermore in UK 
patent law post-Brexit. To ensure that the European patent system becomes more harmonised and 
continues to take into account societal concerns, it is imperative that the CJEU retains its role and has 
a say in the interpretation of the substantive patent law of the UPP, but also that those outside the EU 
(soon to include the UK) take heed of its decisions, given the harmonising effect that this would have 
for the patent system as a whole. 
 
2. The Unitary Patent Package 
 
The unitary patent package is a legislative package containing two EU regulations and an international 
agreement: EU Regulation 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent 
protection (Regulation 1257), EU Regulation 1260/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
                                                        
3 For the UK’s staunch objection to the involvement of the CJEU, see: Matthias Lamping and Hanns Ullrich, ‘The Impact 
of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court’ (2018) Max Plank Institute for Innovation and Competition, Research 
Paper No. 18-20 citing Theresa May, House of Commons Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, 29 March, Volume 624, 
Column 252. For indication that the UK want to remain part of the proposed system see: Brexit White Paper, ‘The Future 
Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union’ (July 2018) available at: 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/725288/The_future_r
elationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union.pdf> accessed 11 October 2018, paragraph 151; 
and this can also be implied from its ratification of the UPCA, despite Brexit. 
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area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements 
(Regulation 1260), and Agreement 2013/C on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA).4  
If it enters into force, the UPP will introduce a unitary patent for participating EU Member 
States and the UPC to deliver cross-border judgments on unitary patents and non-unitary European 
(European Patent Convention EPC) patents validated in those Member States.5 The UPP aims to 
address issues relating to the prohibitive cost of the current patent systems and the problems related to 
parallel patent litigation. 
Regulation 1257 establishes unitary patent protection for all participating Member States of the 
EU on the basis of Article 118(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and 
applies Council Decision 2011/167/EU, authorising enhanced cooperation.6 The substantive features 
of the European patent with unitary effect have been agreed in that patentability and revocation will 
be governed by the rules of the EPC and Regulation 1257, and the post-grant life of the unitary patent 
will be predominantly governed by the UPCA.7  
Article 3 Regulation 1257 establishes the European patent with unitary effect.8 Uniform 
protection is guaranteed by Article 5 Regulation 1257, which states that the European patent with 
unitary effect confers a right to prevent third parties from committing acts against which that patent 
provides protection throughout participating Member States.9  
It states that those acts against which the patent provides protection are defined by the law 
applied to European patents with unitary effect in the participating Member States whose national law 
is applicable to the European patent with unitary effect as an object of property.10 Prohibited acts are 
not defined directly in Regulation 1257. 
Regulation 1260 establishes the translation arrangements for the proposed European unitary 
patent system on the basis of Article 118(2) TFEU and also applies Council Decision 2011/167/EU, 
authorising enhanced cooperation. The aim of the compromise in Regulation 1260 is to reduce the 
number of translations that are necessary by means of a uniform and simple translation regime for 
European patents with unitary effect. 
The UPCA establishes the UPC: a specialised patent court common to the Member States of 
the EU, for the settlement of disputes relating to European patents with unitary effect, European (EPC) 
patents and applications, and supplementary protection certificates (SPCs). Its purpose is to remedy 
                                                        
4 Council Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection [2012] OJ L 361/1 (Regulation 1257); Council 
Regulation (EU) 1260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements 
[2012] OJ L 361/89 (Regulation 1260); Agreement 2013/C on a Unified Patent Court [2013] OJ L 175/01 (UPCA). 
5 To enter into force, the UPCA is subject to ratification by thirteen participating Member States, including France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. To date, sixteen Member States, including France and the UK, have ratified the UPCA, 
leaving its entry into force dependent on the ratification of Germany. This is currently dependant on a decision of the 
German Constitutional Court on the legality of the UPP, which will be discussed below. Also discussed below is the 
possibility of continued participation of the UK in the UPP post-Brexit. 
6 Council Decision (EU) 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection [2011] OJ L 76/53. 
7 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Is it Back to Square One? An Assessment of the Latest Proposals for a Patent and Court for the Internal 
Market and Possible Alternatives’ (2012) 43(3) IIC 286, 287. 
8 The procedure involved in applying for a European patent with unitary effect under Regulation 1257 is quite simple. A 
patent applicant must follow the procedure for obtaining a European patent under the EPC, including by filing an 
application with the EPO. The EPO will then conduct the necessary search and examination and issue a decision. If 
successful, the patentee has one month after grant from which they can submit a request for unitary effect. If the formal 
requirements for registration are met a European patent with unitary effect must be registered by the EPO. For more on the 
rules relating to the unitary patent see: Decision of the Select Committee of the Administrative Council of 15 December 
2015 adopting the Rules relating to Unitary Patent Protection (SC/D 1/15), available at: <https://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2016/05/a39.html> accessed 8 October 2018. 
9 Article 5(1) Regulation 1257. 
10 Article 5(3) Regulation 1257. 
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the significant variations between national court systems that are detrimental to innovation, by setting 
up the UPC, which has been devised to ensure cross-border, expeditious, and high-quality decisions 
that strike a fair balance between the interests of right holders and other parties.11  
It contains provisions on substantive patent law, defining the rights of the proprietor of a 
European patent with unitary effect or European patent, to prevent the direct and indirect use of the 
invention.12 This includes making, offering, placing on the market or using a product which is the 
subject matter of the patent, or importing or storing the product for those purposes.  
Regarding applicable law, under Article 24 UPCA, the UPC will be required to base its 
decisions on Union law, the UCPA (including its Statute13 and Rules of Procedure14), the EPC, and 
other international agreements applicable to patents that are binding on all the Contracting Member 
States.15 The Court can also apply the national law of a Member State, for example, when dealing with 
rights of prior use or the unitary patent as an object of property.16  
EU law shall have primacy17 and the UPC must cooperate with the CJEU in properly 
interpreting Union law by relying on its jurisprudence and by requesting preliminary rulings in 
accordance with Article 267 TFEU.18  
Following a transitional period of at least seven years, the UPC will have exclusive jurisdiction 
for the Contracting Member States of the UPCA. Therefore, if a European patent with unitary effect, 
or a European (EPC) patent (unless opted out19), is subject to an action outlined in Article 32 UPCA 
the case will be taken before the UPC.20  
To enter into force, the UPCA is subject to ratification by thirteen participating Member States 
of the EU, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom.21 To date, sixteen Member States, 
including France and the UK, have ratified the UPCA, leaving its entry into force dependent on the 
ratification of Germany.  
 
3. Five-year lead up to the UPP: 2009 – 2013 
 
Attempts at a unitary patent system date back to 1949 when French Senator, Henri Longchambon, 
proposed a type of unitary patent system for Europe. Since then, a number of attempts have been made 
to implement such a system.22 In recent history, a long period of negotiation occurred between 2000-
2008, however, that eventually stagnated. 23  
In 2009, the development of an EU patent picked up momentum once again, fuelled by a sense 
of urgency among politicians and EU law makers after over forty years of previous failed attempts.24 
                                                        
11 UPCA, Preamble. 
12 Article 25 and 26 UPCA. 
13 Agreement 2013/C on a Unified Patent Court [2013] OJ L 175/01, Annex I, Statute of the Unified Patent Court. 
14 Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of Procedure (‘Rules’) of the Unified Patent Court, 18th draft of 19 October 
2015. 
15 Article 24(1) UPCA. 
16 Article 24(2) UPCA. 
17 Article 20 UPCA. 
18 Article 21 UPCA. 
19 Article 83 UPCA outlines that unless an action has been brought before either the UPC or a relevant national court, the 
patentee is given the option to opt out of the jurisdiction of the UPC. 
20 A patent mediation and arbitration centre is available under Article 35 UPCA at centres in Ljubljana and Lisbon. 
21 Article 84 UPCA. 
22 For more on this see: Justine Pila, ‘An Historical Perspective I: The Unitary Patent Package’ in Justine Pila and 
Christopher Wadlow (eds), The Unitary EU Patent System (Hart Publishing 2014) and Christopher Wadlow, ‘An Historical 
Perspective II: The Unified Patent Court’ in Justine Pila and Christopher Wadlow (eds), The Unitary EU Patent System 
(Hart Publishing 2014). 
23 For more detail on this period and the lead up to the UPP see: Hugh Dunlop, European Unitary Patent and Unified 
Patent Court (2nd edition, CIPA 2014); and Alfredo Ilardi, The New European Patent (Hart Publishing 2015). 
24 This sense of urgency was captured by many online blogs such as (but not limited to) IPKat, Managing IP, and EPLAW 
Blog, as well as the Max Planck Institute in their report: Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger, Matthias Lamping and Hanns 
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However, it would be another five years before the UPP was finalised,25 and another five years (and 
counting) passing since then without the UPP entering into force.  
The five-year lead up to the finalisation of the UPP was marked by a number of key 
developments. One of the most significant developments related to the role of the CJEU. As will 
analysed below, despite shaping the UPP through its official opinions and judgments, essentially 
having the final say on whether or not it was compatible with EU law and therefore viable, a number 
of attempts were made to limit the jurisdiction of the CJEU over substantive patent law provisions in 
the final iteration of the UPP. 
 
3.1 How the CJEU shaped the UPP 
 
In 2009, the EU Council requested an opinion from the CJEU on the compatibility of the then most 
recent attempt at implementing a European patent court, the European and Community/European 
Union Patent Court (EEUPC) Agreement, with the EU Treaties. In 2011, the CJEU issued its opinion 
(Opinion 1/09) 26 where it was held that the draft agreement was incompatible with EU law:  
 
[T]he envisaged agreement, by conferring on an international court which is outside the 
institutional and judicial framework of the European Union an exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear a significant number of actions brought by individuals in the field of the [European 
Union] patent and to interpret and apply European Union law in that field, would deprive 
courts of Member States of their powers in relation to the interpretation and application of 
European Union law and the Court of its powers to reply, by preliminary ruling, to 
questions referred by those courts and, consequently, would alter the essential character of 
the powers which the Treaties confer on the institutions of the European Union and on the 
Member States and which are indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of 
European Union law.27 
 
The Court expressed that the Member States are the ‘guardians’ of the EU legal order and so removing 
their right to refer questions to the CJEU was incompatible with the EU Treaties.28 Furthermore, as 
there would be no way to ensure the EEUPC would refer questions to the CJEU on matters of EU law, 
and without remedies for individuals against breaches of EU law,29 the agreement was not in line with 
the Treaties.30 The implementation of a unified litigation system for patents in Europe was 
consequently prolonged once again. 
In the meantime, disagreements over the proposed translation requirements remained at the 
centre of the EU patent debate. The EU Council eventually decided to launch enhanced cooperation in 
                                                        
Ullrich, ‘The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern’ [2012] Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property 
& Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-12 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169254> accessed 
27 September 2018. 
25 The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court was signed in December 2013. 
26 Opinion 1/09 ECLI:EU:C:2011:123 (Opinion 1/09).  
27 Opinion 1/09, para 89. 
28 Opinion 1/09, para 66. 
29 Thomas Jaeger, ‘What’s in the Unitary Patent Package?’ [2014] Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & 
Competition Law Research Paper No. 14 – 08 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435125> accessed 
27 September 2018, 12. 
30 Opinion 1/09, para 89. 
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the area of unitary patent protection.31 This was requested by twelve Member States, and eventually 
followed by all remaining Member States with the exception of Italy and Spain.32  
The European Parliament granted consent to the use of enhanced cooperation in February, and 
on 11 March 2011, the Council adopted a decision authorising said enhanced cooperation.33 The 
Commission then proposed two regulations. The first contained a framework for conferring unitary 
patent protection, and the second contained translation arrangements, both of which the Council 
approved in June 2011, after much debate and deliberation by Member States.34   
In a joint statement by Commissioner Michel Barnier and Minister of State Zoltán Cséfalvay it 
was announced that:  
 
[By w]orking closely with the European Parliament, the final objective – the creation of 
unitary patent protection – is within reach. If we maintain our present momentum and 
cooperative spirit, a unitary patent in Europe could be a reality within the next two years.35 
 
Undetectable in this optimistic statement was the reality of a situation in which Spain and Italy had, 
only one month previously, brought an action against the Council to the CJEU for its unlawful 
implementation of enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection,36 
essentially putting the success of the lengthy negotiations at risk. It was argued that by authorising 
enhanced cooperation, the Council had circumvented the requirement for unanimity and unduly 
dismissed their objections regarding translation requirements.  
Again, the CJEU had a say in whether the UPP was compatible with EU law. This case was 
dismissed by the CJEU just under two years later, as well as another case brought by Spain alone.37 
Here, the CJEU had the opportunity to further shape the unitary patent Regulations. It had been argued, 
amongst other issues, that the enhanced cooperation procedure was not a last resort as required. If the 
CJEU had agreed with the arguments made by Spain, negotiations may have continued and perhaps 
the enhanced cooperation procedure would not have been necessary, resulting in a more inclusive 
unitary patent system (for the EU at least). However, the CJEU did not find that any of the issues raised 
by Spain were valid and so the Regulations remained the same and were implemented by enhanced 
cooperation.  
Meanwhile, the Hungarian Presidency of the EU proposed that negotiations should be resumed 
on the creation of the unified patent litigation system based on a Commission non-paper containing 
potential solutions to the problems identified in Opinion 1/09.38 In June 2011, a full amendment of the 
                                                        
31 Proposal for a Council Decision (EU) 2010/0384 (NLE) authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection [2010] COM(2010) 790 final. 
32 Enhanced cooperation is a procedure that allows a minimum of nine EU Member States to cooperate in a certain area 
without the participation of all Member States. The aim of this procedure is to overcome deadlock, to be used only as a 
last resort. 
33 Council Decision (EU) 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of 
unitary patent protection [2011] OJ L 76/53. 
34 Council General Approach (EU) 11328/11 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the Council and the European Parliament 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection and on the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable 
translation arrangements [2011] PI 67 CODEC 995. 
35 European Commission Press Release (EU) MEMO/11/463 Joint Statement of Commissioner Michel Barnier and 
Minister of State Zoltán Cséfalvay, Chairman of the Competitiveness Council, on unitary patent protection [2011] 
MEMO/11/463. 
36 Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European Union 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:240. 
37 Case C-146/13 Kingdom of Spain v European Parliament and the Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2015:298 
and Case C-147/13 Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2015:299. 
38 Council Orientation Debate (EU) 10630/11 creating a Unified Patent Litigation System [2011] PI 54 COUR 28. 
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now UPCA was put forward for deliberation.39 In September 2011, the Polish Presidency of the EU 
submitted an amended text.40 The text was debated extensively in the following months and in the face 
of opposition to the agreement from practitioners and others who believed that the proposals were 
being rushed through, the text was rejected. In October 2011, the agreement was further examined for 
compatibility with Opinion 1/09.41  
Draft after draft of the agreement was released, each one attempting to rectify certain issues 
with the last. These issues included opposition to the translation arrangements, the role that the CJEU 
would take in the proposed system, and the location of the central division of the proposed UPC. The 
draft regulations and the agreement became known as the unitary patent package.  
 
3.2 Attempts to limit the role of the CJEU 
 
In December 2011, the momentum to reach an agreement on the package reached its height, though 
with negotiations and deliberations happening in camera, the public were left unaware as to what was 
happening.42 The European Parliament issued a press release43 with news that political agreement had 
been reached on the UPP (which took many by surprise) and it would now only require approval by 
Parliament and Council to take effect.44 This gave the impression to some that there was an 
unnecessary push behind the implementation of the package.45 For practitioners and patent applicants 
alike, who were prevented from commenting because of the secrecy of negotiations, there was a sense 
that the process had become unduly politicised and undemocratic.46 
With the meetings still being held in camera, information about their progress was difficult to 
obtain, and the information that was offered to the public was not always clear. According to Poland’s 
European Affairs Minister, Mikolaj Dowgielewicz, at the time: 
 
Essentially the whole package is negotiated, it’s final. Nevertheless, due to the resistance 
to compromise of one or two member states, we will not decide this year on the seat of the 
court… This is an issue where we have just hit the wall.47  
 
Having hit this wall it took twelve months of deliberations to resolve the central division dispute, as 
well as other important issues, including the role of the CJEU in the proposed European unitary patent 
system. The issue regarding the role of the CJEU related to the extent to which it would have a say in 
the interpretation of the substantive provisions applicable to the unitary patent.  
                                                        
39 Presidency Text (EU) 11533/11 on a Draft agreement on a Unified Patent Court and draft Statute [2011] PI 68 COUR 
32. 
40 Revised Presidency Text (EU) 13751/11 on a Draft agreement on a Unified Patent Court and draft Statute [2011] PI 108 
COUR 48. 
41 Opinion of the Legal Service (EU) 15856/11 on the compatibility of the draft agreement with the Opinion 1/09 [2011] 
PI 138 COUR 61. 
42 Since this period of time, Ingve Björn Stjerna has published translations of meetings from the European Parliament and 
its Legal Affairs Committee. See: Ingve Björn Stjerna, The Parliamentary History of the European ‘Unitary Patent’: 
Verbatim protocol of selected meetings in the European Parliament and its Legal Affairs Committee (Tredition 2015). 
43 European Parliament, ‘Done deal on the EU patent?’ [2011] 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20111201IPR33061/20111201IPR33061_en.pdf> accessed 
27 September 2018. 
44 These views were expressed in: <http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/recap-update-unitary-patent-system-and.html> 
accessed 27 September 2018. 
45 These views were expressed in: <http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/recap-update-unitary-patent-system-and.html> 
accessed 27 September 2018. 
46 These views were expressed in: <http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/recap-update-unitary-patent-system-and.html> 
accessed 27 September 2018. 
47 Competitiveness Council of the EU, Press Conference of 5 December [2011] 
<http://video.consilium.europa.eu/webcast.aspx?ticket=775-979-10496> accessed 27 September 2018. 
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Originally, Regulation 1257 contained substantive patent law provisions on prohibiting use, 
injunctions following a finding of validity and infringement, and provisions on limitations (Articles 6-
848). Fronted by the UK, it was argued that if the Regulations were to contain these provisions, the 
CJEU would play too significant a role in substantive patent law.  
A compromise was reached, resulting in the deletion of Articles 6-8 from Regulation 1257 and 
their transfer into the UPCA.49 This compromise meant that the substantive law provisions of the 
package that related to the rights conferred by the unitary patent were moved from the EU Regulation, 
wherein they would fall within the jurisdiction of the CJEU, to the non-EU draft agreement, in which 
they would be outside that jurisdiction. However, whether those provisions are outside the jurisdiction 
of the CJEU is questionable, which will be addressed below. 
This debate and decision caused much of the initial controversy surrounding Regulation 1257 
and has created a degree of legal uncertainty regarding the role of the CJEU in the proposed unitary 
patent system. While the compromise enabled the package to be concluded, it also caused further 
concerns amongst commentators who again believed that the proposals had been rushed through 
without proper evaluation of their implications.50 The central division dispute was resolved by splitting 
the division in three, with the seat in Paris and clusters in London and Munich 51  
In December 2012, agreement was achieved and the unitary patent package was finally 
approved. The regulations on the creation of unitary patent protection52 and the applicable translation 
arrangements53 were adopted.54 In February 2013, the text of the Agreement on a Unified Patent 
Court55 was finalised; twenty-five out of twenty-seven (at the time) EU Member States’ signatures 
were collected;56 and the process of ratification and implementation began, which is yet to be 
completed. 
 
4. Possible reasons for attempting to limit the role of the CJEU and the result of those efforts 
 
One of the most significant aspects from this five-year lead up was the contrast between the 
involvement of the CJEU in framing and shaping the content of the UPP and the subsequent attempt 
to remove any potential for CJEU involvement in the system once it was up and running.  
                                                        
48 Based on Articles 29-31 Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (15 December 1975) (Community 
Patent Convention) (CPC) or Articles 25-27 Council Agreement 89/695/EEC of 15 December 1989 relating to Community 
Patents [1989] OJ L 401/1 (Community Patent Agreement). 
49 European Parliament, ‘Parliament approves EU unitary patent rules’ [2012] 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20121210IPR04506/parliament-approves-eu-unitary-patent-rules> 
accessed 27 September 2018.  
50 This opinion and other concerns have been expressed by many online blogs such as (but not limited to) IPKat, Managing 
IP, and EPLAW Blog, as well as the Max Planck Institute in their report: Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger, Matthias Lamping 
and Hanns Ullrich, ‘The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern’ [2012] Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-12 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169254> 
accessed 27 September 2018. 
51 Michael Cross, ‘City: Three Way Split for European Patent Court’ [2012] 27 LS Gaz 6(3). 
52 Council Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of unitary patent protection [2012] OJ L 361/1. 
53 Council Regulation (EU) 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements [2012] OJ L 361/89.  
54 The Regulations were adopted by: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom. This includes all EU Member States with the exception of: 
Spain, Croatia, and Italy. Italy has since adopted the Regulations. 
55 Agreement 2013/C on a Unified Patent Court [2013] OJ L 175/01. 
56 The Agreement was signed by: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and United Kingdom. This includes all EU Member States with the exception of Croatia, 
Poland, and Spain. 
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The compromise achieved, elaborated on above, was essentially due to a demand by the UK 
which would not participate in the proposed system if the CJEU had jurisdiction over substantive 
patent law.57 Besides the political reasons set against the CJEU, its position as leading institution in a 
European-wide patent framework has also been weakened by its controversial jurisprudence in patent 
law matters. It is perceived by some that the CJEU has not had the best record in its decisions 
concerning patent law,58 however, this article questions whether this is a valid presumption and/or 
reason to limit its jurisdiction.  
The CJEU has not had the opportunity to interpret patent law in many cases, however, when it 
has, controversy and criticism has followed. In two areas specifically the CJEU has been especially 
controversial in its decisions: the exception to patentability regarding the use of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes as well as the regulation of supplementary protection certificates 
(SPCs).  
In both of these areas, the EU has introduced legislation in order to harmonise the approach 
taken towards these issues across all EU Member States.59 First, regulations on SPCs were 
implemented in order to ensure that across all Member States a protection mechanism was in place to 
make up for any lost patent protection time because of market authorisation delays. Second, the 
Biotech Directive was implemented in order to encourage a strong biotechnology industry in Europe 
by introducing effective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States, as well as to protect 
fundamental rights, such as human dignity.60  
Given the existence of EU law in these areas of patent law, EU Member States have a duty to 
refer questions to the CJEU if there are uncertainties regarding the correct interpretation of these 
provisions.61 Furthermore, despite the criticism surrounding the decisions in these areas, there would 
be significant implications if the CJEU were to be restricted from interpreting these patent law matters. 
First, the generalist overview that is necessary to take the wider societal implications of patent law 
decisions into account would no longer exist. Second, the harmonisation that follows from CJEU 
decisions would also be lost. 
 
4.1 The Controversial Case Law – SPC Regulations 
 
The EU first became involved with patents through the implementation of two regulations; one 
concerning SPCs for medicinal products and another for plant protection products.62  
                                                        
57 Winfried Tilmann, ‘The compromise on the uniform protection for EU patents’ (2013) 8(1) JIPLP 78. 
58 See for example: Robin Jacob, ‘The Relationship between European and National Courts in Intellectual Property Law’ 
in Ansgar Ohly and Justine Pila (eds), The Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law: Towards a European Legal 
Methodology (OUP 2013) 198; Tuomas Mylly, ‘A Constitutional Perspective’ in Justine Pila and Christopher Wadlow 
(eds), The Unitary EU Patent System (Hart Publishing 2014); Thomas Jaeger, ‘What’s in the Unitary Patent Package?’ 
[2014] Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 14 – 08 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435125> accessed 27 September 2018, 8. 
59 Council Regulation (EC) 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (codified version) [2009] OJ L 152/1; Council Regulation (EC) 
1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for plant protection products [1996] OJ L 198/30; Council Directive 98/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L 213/13 
(Biotech Directive). 
60 Recital 3, Biotech Directive. 
61 This duty is under Article 267 TFEU. 
62 Council Regulation (EC) 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (codified version) [2009] OJ L 152/1 and Council Regulation 
(EC) 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for plant protection products [1996] OJ L 198/30 (SPC Regulations). 
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An SPC is distinct from a patent; it is a sui generis right that extends the protection afforded to 
a patented product, in certain circumstances, for a limited period of time.63 It was deemed necessary 
by the EU to implement a uniform solution at Community level to provide for situations where ‘the 
period that elapses between the filing of an application for a patent for a new medicinal or plant product 
and the authorisation to place that product on the market, makes the period of effective protection 
under the patent insufficient to cover the investment put into research’.64 
A uniform solution, in the form of an SPC was implemented to harmonise and promote the 
functioning of the internal market in order to remove the risk of discrepancies arising that would incite 
the relocation of research to countries offering greater protection.65  
The interpretation of the Regulations by the CJEU, especially with regard to medicinal 
products, has been the subject of considerable controversy.66 The CJEU has been criticised for failing 
to clearly answer the questions referred to it by domestic courts.67 However, that there have been so 
many cases referred to the CJEU on the content of these Regulations is often down to the legislation 
itself being particularly vague. Furthermore, the CJEU has also been criticised for going too far in 
other rulings (see below for example, in relation to ‘human embryos’) and so a fine balance is required 
between decisions that are detailed enough and those having too much detail, a balance that is difficult 
to find in all decisions.  
In reference to the SPC Regulations, a relatively high number of cases have been referred to 
the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 3 Regulation 469/2009. Article 3 states that an SPC will be 
granted if ‘the product is protected by a basic patent in force’. There have been some issues with SPCs 
relating to inventions claiming active ingredients/combinations of active ingredients and the criteria 
required to decide whether ‘the product is protected by a basic patent in force.’  
A number of referrals have been attempted to gain clarity on the interpretation of this vague 
provision, including (but not limited to) Medeva, Eli Lilly, and Actavis v Boeringher.68 Additionally, 
Teva v Gilead, decided in 2018, has added some more detail to the discussion.69 
In Medeva, the referring court asked what was meant by ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ 
and what were the determining criteria in a number of different circumstances, such as when a medical 
product contains more than one active ingredient. The CJEU ruled that the active ingredient had to be 
‘specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent relied on in support of the application’ to be 
granted an SPC.70 However, the Court did not specify how ‘specified’ should be interpreted and so 
questions remained over how specific the claims needed to be for an SPC to be granted over a number 
of active ingredients.  
                                                        
63 Article 13 Regulation 469/2009. 
64 Recital 4 Regulation 469/2009. 
65 Annette Kur and Thomas Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases & Materials (Edward Elgar 2013) 
145. 
66 For an extensive study on the legal aspects of the SPCs, see: European Commission Report, ‘Study on the Legal 
Aspects of Supplementary Protection Certificates in the EU’ (2018) available at: 
<https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6845fac2-6547-11e8-ab9c-01aa75ed71a1/language-
en> accessed 8 October 2018. 
67 Darren Smyth, ‘Two gaps instead of one: the CJEU’s effect on Supplementary Protection Certificate jurisprudence’ 
(2014) 9(6) JIPLP 445. See also the Swiss Federal Patent Court judgment in Teva v Gilead 
(https://www.bundespatentgericht.ch/fileadmin/entscheide/O2017_001_Urteil_2017-10-03.pdf) wherein the court 
summarised CJEU case law on SPCs and refused to follow its rulings as they were unclear – reported in English by 
Lexology, available at: <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c361ffe8-bbe6-4514-822e-8b08f2629261> 
accessed 8 October 2018. In the spirit of harmonisation, on appeal, the Federal Supreme Court in Switzerland has since 
ruled that for new SPCs, the CJEU Medeva test will apply. 
68 Case C-322/10 Medeva v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks ECLI:EU:C:2011:773; Case C-
493/12 Eli Lilly v Human Genome Sciences ECLI:EU:C:2013:835; and Case C-577/13 Actavis v Boehringer 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:165. 
69 Case C-121/17 Teva UK v Gilead Sciences Inc ECLI:EU:C:2018:585. 
70 Case C-322/10 Medeva v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks ECLI:EU:C:2011:773, para 43. 
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Owing to the uncertainty created, in Eli Lilly, the CJEU was asked what the criteria are for 
determining whether ‘the product is protected by a basic patent in force’ in relation to a combination 
product – Eli Lilly had claimed that an antibody relating to the invention contained in the SPC owned 
by Human Genome Sciences was not ‘specified’. The Court ruled that it was not necessary for the 
active ingredient to be identified in the claims but that was on the condition that where the active 
ingredient is covered by a functional formula in the claims, it was possible to conclude that the claims 
related ‘implicitly but necessarily and specifically’ to the active ingredient.71 That decision was seen 
as not being detailed enough and did not add much to the previous case law – the CJEU ruling was 
found to be ‘disappointing’ by the implementing court because although the CJEU gave some 
indication as to how active ingredients ought to be specified, there was no express guidance.72 
A question on Article 3 was again referred in Actavis v Boehringer. The case concerned 
Boehringer’s attempt to gain an SPC over their patented product (on which they already had an SPC) 
combined with another active ingredient, which was detailed in a subsequent claim. The CJEU held 
that if an SPC had already been obtained on the first claimed active ingredient which was the ‘sole 
subject matter of the invention’, it was not possible to have another SPC on that product combined 
with another active ingredient.73 This reflected an earlier decision in Actavis v Sanofi that rejected a 
combo-SPC where the ‘core-inventive advance’ had already been subject to a SPC.74  
Most recently, in 2018, the CJEU once again handed down a ruling following another referral 
that asked what the criteria were for deciding whether ‘the product is protected by a basic patent in 
force’ relating to combinations of active ingredients.75 In its answer, the Court stated that ‘a product 
composed of several active ingredients with a combined effect is ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ 
within the meaning of that provision where, even if the combination of active ingredients of which that 
product is composed is not expressly mentioned in the claims of the basic patent, those claims relate 
necessarily and specifically to that combination’ and gave more detail by stating that ‘the combination 
of those active ingredients must necessarily, in the light of the description and drawings of that patent, 
fall under the invention covered by that patent, and each of those active ingredients must be specifically 
identifiable, in the light of all the information disclosed by that patent.’76 
Although the Court did not provide any further guidance on for example, what is meant by 
‘specifically identifiable’, or what is meant by active ingredients having to ‘fall under the invention 
covered by that patent’ it is more detail than what has previously been provided and can be applied 
more generally. It appears that an attempt has been made to be more detailed in this response, which 
should also be carried out for future cases to further clarify the uncertainties that remain in this area. 
It is clear from the number of cases relating to inventions concerning active 
ingredients/combinations of active ingredients that have been referred to the CJEU asking what the 
criteria are to determine if ‘the product is protected by a basic patent in force’ that the answers 
previously returned were unsatisfactory and unclear. The result of this is confusion, uncertainty, and a 
level of distrust in the CJEU when it comes to giving clear guidance on issues relating to the protection 
of inventions. Attempts in Teva v Gilead have arguably assisted to a certain degree, however, two 
further cases are awaiting judgment.77 For the distrust that exists to dissipate, the CJEU must further 
clarify this area and give more detailed guidance. 
Owing to the time, effort and cost of referring a question to the CJEU, coupled with the unclear 
guidance that returns, it has been proposed that national courts should stop referring these questions to 
                                                        
71 Case C-493/12 Eli Lilly v Human Genome Sciences ECLI:EU:C:2013:835, para 45. 
72 Eli Lilly v Human Genome Sciences [2014] EWHC 2404 (Pat), para 63. 
73 Case C-577/13 Actavis v Boehringer ECLI:EU:C:2015:165, para 42. 
74 Case C-443/12 Actavis v Sanofi ECLI:EU:C:2013:833. 
75 Case C-121/17 Teva UK v Gilead Sciences Inc ECLI:EU:C:2018:585. 
76 Case C-121/17 Teva UK v Gilead Sciences Inc ECLI:EU:C:2018:585, para 58. 
77 Case C-650/17 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundespatentgericht lodged on 21 November 2017 2018/C 
052/28 and Case C-114/18 Request for a preliminary ruling from Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) 
made on 14 February 2018 – Sandoz Ltd, Hexal AG v GD Seale LLC, Jansses Sciences Ireland 2018/C 152/20. 
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the CJEU and decide on them in a manner that is as consistent as possible.78 In general, national courts 
continue to refer questions to the CJEU even when it takes a long time to get an answer and those 
answers remain unclear.79 However, it must be borne in mind that the CJEU has to find a balance 
between guiding Member States on the correct general interpretation of certain provisions that are 
often quite vague to begin with on the one hand, and going too far/getting too detailed on the other 
hand. Rulings from the CJEU need to be somewhat vague given their future application to all cases 
related to the particular provision in question at the time.  
 
4.2 The Controversial Case Law – Biotech Directive 
 
The most significant example of the involvement of the EU in the European patent system is the 
implementation of the Biotech Directive in 1998. The Directive seeks to achieve its aims by setting 
out the conditions for patentability of biotechnological inventions and the subject matter that is 
excluded from patentability. In doing so, it restates the core provisions of the EPC and explains how 
they relate to biotechnological inventions. In 1999, only one year after its introduction, the provisions 
of the Directive were incorporated into the Implementing Regulations to the EPC.80 
One of the most controversial and therefore most relevant aspects of the Biotech Directive for 
this article has been the interpretation of Article 6(2)(c), which excludes from patentability inventions 
whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality, and specifically the use 
of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. 
In Case C-34/10, also known as the Brüstle decision, a reference for a preliminary ruling was 
requested by the German Supreme Court81 under Article 267 TFEU.82 The case concerned a patent 
relating to neural precursor cells and the processes for their production from embryonic stem cells, as 
well as their use for therapeutic purposes. The German court, amongst other questions, asked the CJEU 
what was meant by the term ‘human embryo’ in Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive.83 
The CJEU was of the opinion that the term must be regarded ‘as designating an autonomous 
concept of EU law’ for the purposes of the application of the Directive, which must be ‘interpreted in 
a uniform manner throughout the territory of the Union’.84 It went on to define ‘human embryo’ – 
having regard to the fundamental rights underpinnings of the patentability exclusion in which the term 
appeared – as: 
 
[A]ny human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell 
nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised human 
ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis.85 
 
In doing so, the CJEU ensured that the term ‘human embryo’ was given a significantly broad 
definition, which had the effect of restricting the commercialisation of innovation in this area, but also 
closely harmonised this area of patent law.  
                                                        
78 Smyth, Two gaps instead of one, 445. 
79 Cases such as: Case C-567/16 Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade 
Marks ECLI:EU:C:2017:948; and Case C-121/17 Teva UK v Gilead Sciences Inc ECLI:EU:C:2018:585. These recent 
cases have been subject to criticisms on many blogs online such as (but not limited to) Lexology and IPKat. 
80 Chapter V, Rule 26(1) Implementing Regulations to the EPC 2000. 
81 Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, 17 December 2009 (Xa ZR 58/07) – ‘Neurale Vorläuferzellen (Neural precursor 
cells).’ 
82 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV. ECLI:EU:C:2011:669. 
83 For more detailed commentary on the CJEU ruling in this case, see, for example: Martine Ines Schuster, ‘The Court of 
Justice of the European Union’s ruling on the patentability of human embryonic stem-cell-related inventions (case C-
34/10)’ (2012) 43(6) IIC 626. 
84 Brüstle, para 26. 
85 Brüstle, para 38. 
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Brüstle may have closely harmonised the area, however, it has been questioned by commentators 
whether this was appropriate or progressive.86 Although the CJEU has considered the intention of the 
legislator to protect fundamental rights and human dignity, the decision has been criticised87 as one 
that has gone too far by overly simplifying and giving an ‘incomplete analysis of the human rights 
situation’.88 By defining ‘human embryo’ expansively and as an autonomous concept of EU law, the 
CJEU has ignored the fact that various definitions existed in many Member States and in doing so, has 
ignored considerations of national diversity.89  
This case first raises a question as to whether the identification of terms as autonomous concepts 
of EU law is an appropriate action for the CJEU to take in circumstances involving morality in patent 
law, but also morality in general. It could be argued that in doing so, the CJEU is moving from the 
realm of judicial interpretation into that of judicial activism.90 However, the reason for referring 
questions to the CJEU is to clear up areas where the correct interpretation of a provision is unclear. 
The expectant result is an answer that applies across the EU for all Member States to consider in future. 
In patent law, the CJEU is better placed to give a generalist answer on morality rather than one that 
would possibly disregard wider societal implications.  
 Second, Aurora Plomer argues that by imposing uniform exclusions based on human dignity 
where reality points to diversity threatens not only the sovereignty of Member States but also the 
integrity of the CJEU.91 Previously, in the Omega case, the CJEU had emphasised the need to ensure 
a margin of appreciation to EU Member States regarding the meaning and requirements of human 
dignity.92 Furthermore, the CJEU had previously held in the Netherlands case that provisions of the 
Biotech Directive should allow Member States a wide scope of manoeuvre and discretion in their 
application.93 If the CJEU had followed its own case law and displayed restraint in Brüstle, it could 
have left some room to manoeuvre for national courts. Requiring Member States to by-pass the 
legislature by adopting a definition of ‘human embryo’ that is different from the definitions supported 
by the majority of EU Member States, has important implications for other areas of law and social 
policy.94 
                                                        
86 Shane Burke, ‘Interpretative clarification of the concept of “human embryo” in the context of the Biotechnology 
Directive and the implications for patentability: Brüstle v Greenpeace eV (C-34/10)’ (2012) 34(5) EIPR 346, 349. For 
more commentaries on this, see footnotes below. 
87 For a brief outline of the criticisms of Brüstle, see: Scott Parker and Paul England, ‘Where now for stem cell patents?’ 
(2012) 7(10) EIPR 738, 743. 
88 Ansgar Ohly, ‘European Fundamental Rights and Intellectual Property’ in Ansgar Ohly and Justine Pila (eds), The 
Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law: Towards a European Legal Methodology (OUP 2013) 159. 
89 As mentioned in: Justine Pila, ‘A Constitutionalized Doctrine of Precedent and the Marleasing Principle as a Bases for 
a European Legal Methodology’ in Ansgar Ohly and Justine Pila (eds), The Europeanization of Intellectual Property Law: 
Towards a European Legal Methodology (OUP 2013) 236. This was also one of the reasons of the European Court of 
Human Rights when it decided not to define when the right to life begins. It was stated that the issue of when the right to 
life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considered that States should enjoy 
themselves: Vo v France App no 53924/00 (ECtHR 8 July 2004), para 82; Evans v UK App no 6339/05 (ECtHR, 7 March 
2006), para 46. 
90 Andrea Faeh, ‘Judicial activism, the Biotech Directive and its institutional implications: is the court acting as a legislator 
or a court when defining the “human embryo”?’ (2015) 40(4) EL Rev 613. 
91 Aurora Plomer, ‘After Brüstle: EU accession to the ECHR and the future of European patent law’ (2012) 2(2) Queen 
Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 110, 125.  
92 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:614 (Omega). 
93 This point seemed to have been forgotten in Brüstle, as noted in the following article: Shawn HE Harmon, Graeme 
Laurie and Aidan Courtney, ‘Dignity, plurality and patentability: the unfinished story of Brustle v Greenpeace’ (2013) 
38(1) EL Rev 92. 
94 Justine Pila and Paul Torremans, European Intellectual Property Law (OUP 2016) 107. 
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However, the CJEU backtracked on its decision in Brüstle only three years later when a question 
on the interpretation of Article 6(2)(c) of the Biotech Directive, specifically regarding the previous 
interpretation of the term ‘human embryo’, was referred to the CJEU by the UK.95  
In Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCC)96 the CJEU clarified its earlier 
decision in Brüstle and decided that an unfertilised human ovum whose division and further 
development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis does not constitute a ‘human embryo’ if it does 
not, in itself, ‘have the inherent capacity of developing into a human being’.97 The effect of the decision 
is that rather than the definition of ‘human embryo’ concerning the capability of the ovum to commence 
the development into a human being (Brüstle), it must have the inherent capacity of developing into a 
human being (ISCC). This opened up the doors that Brüstle closed for patents on inventions using ova 
stimulated by parthenogenesis, which would never have the capacity to develop into a human being 
but commences that process.  
The reason behind this clarification was because the CJEU in the Brüstle case based its findings 
on observations that considered that the non-fertilised ovum stimulated by parthenogenesis would be 
capable of full development, which was inaccurate.98 This type of misunderstanding is one of the 
causes for concern amongst those who believe that the CJEU should not have a say in the interpretation 
of substantive patent law matters as a technically qualified court may have realised this inaccuracy. 
However, this inaccuracy was presented to the Court as fact and there would have been no reason for 
the CJEU to question this information at the time. As can be seen from the ISCC decision, had the 
CJEU known that this information was inaccurate, they arguably would not have come to same 
conclusion in Brüstle. 
Overall, the ISCC decision has been welcomed and has somewhat reopened the doors of 
commercialising research in this area.99 Some commentators are of the opinion that this is a step in the 
right direction, but that it does not take away from the fact that the CJEU has defined subject matter 
that, in this case, it ought to have left to the discretion of national courts in the first place100 and so a 
distrust remains. 
 
4.3 The CJEU has a poor track record in patent law, but should that be a reason for limiting its 
jurisdiction? 
 
From the above examples, it can be seen that in patent law the CJEU has delivered decisions that have 
been controversial, albeit in the relatively few relevant cases. In certain instances, the CJEU has 
arguably gone too far in its interpretation of substantive patent law and in others it has caused 
significant confusion, so the presumption that the CJEU has a poor track record in patent law is valid, 
albeit with qualification.  
The overarching problem that has been expressed regarding the jurisdiction of the CJEU over 
the UPP and patent matters in general is the fact that as a generalist court, it does not have the expertise 
                                                        
95 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents [2013] EWHC 807 (Ch). 
96 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (ISCC) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451. 
97 ISCC, para 28. 
98 ISCC, para 31 and 32. 
99 See for example: Sebastian Moore and Andrew Wells, ‘Clarification of European law relating to stem cell patents’ (2015) 
37(4) EIPR 258; and Ella O’Sullivan, ‘International Stem Cell Corp v Comptroller General of Patents: the debate regarding 
the definition of the human embryo continues’ (2014) 36(3) EIPR 155. O’Sullivan welcomes this clarification but questions 
whether it entirely opens the doors for the patentability of inventions involving parthenotes. 
100 Timo Minssen and Ana Nordberg, ‘The evolution of the CJEU’s case law on stem cell patents: Context, outcome and 
implications of Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation’ [2015] 5 Nordic Intellectual Property Law Review 
493; Ana Nordberg and Timo Minssen, ‘A “Ray of Hope” for European Stem Cell Patents or “Out of the Smog into the 
Fog”? An Analysis of Recent European Case Law and How it Compares to the US’ [2016] 47 IIC 138. 
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necessary to deliver judgments on patent law.101 As seen, not many patent cases have been decided, 
but those that exist have resulted in controversy. For example, the Brüstle ruling that went too far by 
defining the term ‘human embryo’ as it did, 102 and the rulings on the SPC Regulations that have caused 
legal uncertainty in the area. A lack of expertise in patent law on the part of the CJEU is said to have 
been one of the causes of these issues in patent law judgments.  
However, in both instances there have been external circumstances that have led to this 
apparent poor record in patent law. For decisions relating to the SPC Regulations, the Regulations 
themselves are very vague. For decisions relating to ‘human embryos’ the concerning 
misunderstandings of the Court were based on factual evidence submitted to the Court. 
The CJEU’s interpretation of substantive patent law, especially EU patent law, remains entirely 
necessary. In general, other EU principles need to be considered and, in a reversal of the argument 
above, it is argued that specialised patent courts will not necessarily have the expertise or inclination 
to do so adequately.  
This question of whether the CJEU should have jurisdiction in this area is of especial 
importance moving forward given the nature of the proposed unitary patent system. Many 
commentators also argue that this poor track record should not be a reason to limit CJEU jurisdiction. 
For example, it is said that the generalist nature of the CJEU is what is necessary in patent law in order 
to ensure that not only patent rights are considered, but also fundamental rights: 
 
Patent law does not belong exclusively to the worlds of commerce, industry, and 
technology, but rather has other social and cultural dimensions which must be considered 
by the legislature and courts when developing and applying it.103 
 
The advocates of this argument take the view that if the CJEU does not have jurisdiction over the 
proposed unitary patent system, that the UPC could become too specialised. Observers have suggested 
that these generalist interests are and should be shaping core issues of intellectual property through 
proportionality, a trend that should be applauded.104 It has therefore been suggested that the CJEU is 
better equipped to interpret these general provisions and should maintain a generalist role over the 
UPC.105 
According to Rochelle Dreyfuss, an emphasis on experienced patent judges, experts in all fields 
of technology, and training for those who are not experts, may actually have a negative effect on the 
ability of the UPC to see patent law in context, and not as the ‘be all and end all’ of issues.106  
Furthermore, a bias may develop towards technology-based values as a result of this highly 
specialised judiciary. There is the possibility, as mentioned above, that there will be a lack of 
consideration for fundamental rights such as human dignity, health, and welfare. A ‘tunnel-vision’ or 
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‘closed pro-protection perspective’ might emerge, wherein all UPC judgments are based on pure 
substantive patent law and promoting the grant of patents without regard for more general laws and 
issues.107 It is argued that this problem could be remedied quite efficiently by the CJEU and it is 
therefore necessary for the UPC to respect and use this institution to its benefit so that the European 
patent system continues to consider the wider implications of its decisions. 
Some commentators have compared the situation to that in the US.108 The Supreme Court of 
the US, acting as Court of Appeal in patent matters, puts an emphasis on common sense and views 
issues that come before it in a broader and more general perspective than the Federal Circuit.109 This 
has arguably brought patent cases into line and back from the extreme specialisation towards which 
they were headed.110 The CJEU could effectively do the same for the European patent system. 
As pointed out by Alain Strowel and Hee-Eun Kim, the CJEU case law highlights the need for 
a balance between intellectual property rights and other interests.111 While it is admitted that the 
Brüstle judgment went too far by defining human embryo as it did, proponents of its involvement 
suggest that the CJEU was correct in considering constitutional values112 and that there can be ‘no 
doubt’ that the courts must take fundamental rights into account.113 
There have been strong arguments made both against and in favour of the role that the CJEU 
could play alongside the UPC by many commentators – on the one hand that a specialist court is 
necessary to deal with the technical nature of patent law, and on the other hand that patent law cannot 
be defined restrictively, without balancing all rights concerned.114  
Overall, limiting the role of the CJEU would be highly problematic and effectively create a 
patent system that is highly specialised and pro-patent, but possibly one that would disregard other 
important factors. This can already be seen in the extensions and attempted extensions that have been 
made to allow for the granting of more patents. For example, second use patents have been expanded 
and allowed for quite some time, and until the European Commission stepped in, the EPO was also set 
(and possibly still is set) to allow patents on products that are the result of non-patentable essentially 
biological processes.115 This extension of patent protection is set to continue as technology continues 
to develop, and in a field such as biotechnology, it is imperative to keep fundamental rights 
considerations in view. 
Additionally, the harmonising nature of CJEU judgments cannot be disregarded. By handing 
down decisions on the appropriate interpretation of certain provisions for all EU Member States soft 
harmonisation follows, which has a significant impact. 
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Rather than force the CJEU out, there are alternatives ways in which the issues faced in the 
past could be rectified. For example, independent technical experts could be appointed more regularly 
to give specialist information to the CJEU, which could rectify the tarnished view of those that are 
opposed to the CJEU having a say in these matters. Having relevant independent experts available to 
the generalist panel would ensure that the correct technical information is relayed to the Court, which 
will add the necessary level of specialism. The CJEU could also attempt to give more detailed guidance 
on what is meant by a particular word or phrase in its judgments.   
It is clear from the provisions of the UPCA that EU law has primacy and questions shall be 
referred to the CJEU in matters of EU law. The CJEU will surely have a role to play in the proposed 
unitary patent package, but the extent of that role is unsure. 
 
4.4 Did the attempts to limit CJEU jurisdiction work? 
 
Despite the criticisms against CJEU decisions in patent law matters, its generalist nature remains 
essential in considering the wider implications of patents on society and in promoting a harmonised 
approach towards patent law. However, whether the role of the CJEU has been limited in the UPP, as 
attempted, can and has been questioned. 
 As seen, the substantive provisions of the UPP were moved from the EU Regulations to the 
non-EU UPCA. The reasoning behind this was that those provisions would then no longer be a part of 
EU law, and so it would not be possible for the CJEU to interpret them. 
 Although seen as a political success for the UK (leading the charge on this front), this 
compromise may not achieve the intended result. The CJEU could still have jurisdiction over the 
provisions of the UPCA. Rather than clarifying the CJEU’s jurisdiction with respect to substantive 
patent law matters, the move to delete Articles 6-8 has resulted in uncertainty regarding the scope of 
that jurisdiction.  
Some commentators believe that it would be naïve to think that the CJEU will not fill in any 
blanks in substantive patent law that have been left by Regulation 1257116 and could go so far as to 
deem the entire package unconstitutional if referred a question on its interpretation.117 It is likely that 
the CJEU will fill in the blanks and it has sometimes taken an aggressive stance when its own role and 
jurisdiction are challenged;118 however, it must be recalled that the CJEU has had the opportunity to 
shape the Regulations, and had the opportunity to deem their implementation by enhanced cooperation 
unlawful. It is therefore unlikely that it would go so far as to deem the entire package unconstitutional, 
but likely that if referred a question on the interpretation of the UPP provisions, it would not limit itself 
to those contained in the Regulations.  
 Another commentary has stated that the livelihood of the Regulation will ‘depend on how far 
the CJEU will be willing to go – either the CJEU construes the Regulation as incorporating the UPCA 
provisions or as authorising the development of an entirely new body of law’.119 This is an interesting 
point and raises an argument that has been made, by those such as Winfried Tilmann, that the CJEU 
could have jurisdiction over the UPCA through the loop-hole of an ‘incorporating referral’ from the 
Regulations.120  
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Having previously argued that the deletion of Articles 6-8 was not necessary,121 Tilmann 
maintains that the provisions of the UPCA are now part of the Article 5 rule on uniform protection. 
Article 5(3) states that ‘the acts against which the patent provides protection… [are] defined by the 
law applied to European patents with unitary effect in the participating Member State whose national 
law is applicable to the European patent with unitary effect as an object of property’.122   
With the incorporating referral argument, it is said that the national law referred to in Article 
5(3) will be the UPCA once it enters into force. Taking that argument further, Tilmann convincingly 
argues that the UPCA provisions therefore belong to Union law and so, the CJEU could have scope 
over the entire package.123  
This argument is compelling, especially coupled with the previous activity of the CJEU in the 
UPP development. It is entirely likely that the CJEU will continue to shape the UPP, once/if it enters 
into force, and once/if important questions regarding interpretation arise.  
Following Opinion 1/09 and the redrafting of the UPCA, it is also clear that Union law has 
primacy within the proposed unitary patent system. It is therefore argued that the CJEU will likely be 
referred questions on the interpretation of UPP provisions. What is likely is that the CJEU will have a 
say in the interpretation of the entire UPP, but that will entirely depend on the questions that it is 
referred. 
 Finally, it can be assumed that CJEU referrals will have the same impact as they currently do 
in national courts. Therefore, it will be up to the referring division of the UPC (likely the UPC Court 
of Appeal) to interpret the ruling of the CJEU. The interpretation of the referring division will then 
become the interpretation for the entire UPC, partly ensuring the harmonisation that it promises. 
 Overall, that the CJEU will more than likely have a say in not only the interpretation of the 
Regulations but also the UCPA provisions will be of benefit to the UPP. As mentioned, the CJEU can 
maintain a generalist court perspective over the highly specialised UPC, providing a level of assurance 
against the concern relating to tunnel-vision and ensure that fundamental rights are taken into 
consideration, as well as promoting a harmonised approach towards interpretation. 
 However, although attempts to limit CJEU jurisdiction in this way have arguably failed, since 
the UK have now decided to leave the EU questions arise once more as to the involvement that the 
CJEU should have in patent law, especially in the UK and furthermore, whether this will lead to the 
end of the UPP. The question relating to the harmonising role of the CJEU over patent law therefore 
has refreshed significance and could be ultimately affected by Brexit. 
 
5. Brexit, the continued participation of the UK in the UPP, and the role of the CJEU 
 
Since Brexit, the question of the role of the CJEU in the UPP and over substantive patent law needs to 
be analysed from this new perspective. Associated questions relate to the future of the UPP and the 
participation of the UK in it. At the centre of these concerns is whether the UK will be required to 
implement decisions of the CJEU in matters relating to the proposed unitary patent system following 
its departure from the EU if it remains in the unitary patent system. If it is not required to do so, the 
resulting impact could be divergence in the interpretation of patent law provisions to the detriment of 
an efficient and effective European patent system.  
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5.1 Ratification of the UPCA  
 
For the UPP to enter into force, the UPCA must be ratified by thirteen Member States, including 
France, Germany and the UK. Before Brexit, ratification of the Agreement was picking up momentum 
and the UK was making progress in Parliament. France had already ratified the Agreement and 
Germany were also moving forward. However, progress was prolonged when the UK decided, by 
referendum, to leave the EU.  
Following Brexit, the fate of the UPP was once more thrown into question. If the UK were to 
leave the EU, what would become of the UPP? Would and could the UK continue to participate in the 
system? Could the CJEU still have a role over the UPP in relation to the UK? 
If the UK do not or cannot participate in the UPP, it would be a significantly less attractive 
system to the other states concerned. There are a number of reasons for this. The UK has one of the 
highest number of patents in force in the EU124 and in 2017, the UK was in the top ten countries for 
patent applications to the EPO with 5,313 applications.125 More strikingly, however, is that UK 
applicants only amount to 3% of applications made to the EPO. It can be concluded from those 
statistics that patentees in countries outside the UK own the majority of patents in force in the UK.  
Furthermore, patent litigation in the UK is not necessarily common, but it receives a lot of 
attention as courts are known to be thorough and costly.126 It can be foreseen that if the UPP were to 
go ahead without the UK, it may lose the expertise of the UK courts, and a reassessment of UPC court 
fees would have to be undertaken.  
This would make the system less attractive, first, because judges with experience in 
adjudicating on patent law cases (like those from the UK courts) would be very important in the 
development of the new system. This would be especially so in the early days of the system because 
that experience could give users more confidence in the system.  
Second, if the UK is not involved, when deciding on whether to litigate across Europe, users 
would have to consider the cost of the UPC (which would have to be renegotiated) plus the 
significantly high cost of litigation in the UK when deciding whether they should litigate and where 
they should litigate. 
An extensive opinion by Richard Gordon QC and Tom Pascoe on the effect of Brexit on the 
UPP was published in 2016. In that opinion, it was concluded that from a legal perspective the UK 
could remain part of the UPP after Brexit as long as an agreement was entered into with the EU and 
Member States regarding the unitary patent, and the UK agreed to the provisions of the UPCA.127 
Referring the matter to the CJEU was found to be impossible as the EU is not a party to the UPCA.128 
In a response, one commentator, Ingve Björn Stjerna argued that this opinion was essentially 
one sided and not truly objective.129 In his response, he concluded that it is possible for the CJEU to 
rule on the compatibility of the UPCA with Union law – the opportunity lay in the German ratification 
proceedings.130  
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It was contended that any individual affected had the possibility to complain to the German 
Constitutional Court that the UPCA was not compatible with the German Constitution as it 
contradicted Union law and it should therefore not be ratified.131 If that were to happen, it was argued 
that the German Constitutional Court could refer the matter to the CJEU owing to the potential EU 
law violation.132 
This opportunity was taken by Stjerna, who brought a complaint to the German Constitutional 
Court on the basis (amongst other things) that the Agreement was in violation of EU law, and its 
ratification would not be compatible with the German Constitution.133 A decision from the German 
Constitutional Court is expected in 2019.  
Whether the case is referred to the CJEU, as is Stjerna’s apparent intention, is yet to be seen. 
If it were referred, the CJEU would once again have the opportunity to shape the direction of the UPP. 
However, this would further delay the entry into force of the UPP but could ensure its compatibility 
with EU law. 
More recently, a convincing study by Ansgar Ohly and Rudolf Streinz asked whether the UK 
could remain a part of the unitary patent and the UPC.134 It was concluded that in both situations it 
was possible. It was also argued that ‘once the UK ratified the UPCA it will not need to accept the 
supremacy of EU law or the possibility of preliminary references from the UPC to the CJEU by 
separate agreement,’ as the UK will remain a member of the UPCA unless membership is terminated, 
a departure from the Gordon and Pascoe opinion.135 
Since these discussions, the UK has indeed ratified the UPCA, has approved the Protocol on 
Privileges and Immunities and had previously deposited the document required to apply the Protocol 
on Provisional Application of the UCPA.136 There are now two potential ways forward.  
First, before the UK officially leave the EU, Germany could ratify the agreement, and the 
required approvals of the Protocols could take place therein and elsewhere. The UPP would then enter 
into force and the UK would officially be party to the new system. If this were the case, a question 
arises as to whether the UK can remain in the unitary patent system once it leaves the EU, which is a 
question of treaty interpretation.  
The second possibility is that the entry into force of the UPP is delayed until after the UK 
officially leave the EU. The same question then arises as to whether the UK can be a part of the unitary 
patent system having left the EU. 
 
5.2 Post-Ratification and post-Brexit  
 
The question of continued participation only arises once the UK leaves the EU. The reason for this is 
because post-ratification and pre-Brexit the situation is the same as if the UK were remaining in the 
EU. It is only after the UK leave that the question of continued participation becomes relevant. 
                                                        
131 Stjerna, 8. 
132 Stjerna, 8. 
133 A complaint (2 BvR 739/17) made to the German Constitutional Court will apparently be decided upon in 2019, as 
evidenced by the Court’s list of cases at: 
<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Jahresvorausschau/vs_2019/vorausschau_2019_node.html> 
last accessed 25 February 2019. 
134 Ansgar Ohly and Rudolf Streinz, ‘Can the UK stay in the UPC system after Brexit?’ (2017) 12(3) JIPLP 245. For further 
opinions on the UPP post-Brexit see: Thomas Jaeger, ‘Reset and Go: The Unitary Patent System Post-Brexit’ (2016) SSRN 
Discussion Paper; María Aránzazu Gandía Sellens, ‘The Viability of the Unitary Patent Package After the UK’s 
Ratification of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court’ (2018) 49 IIC 136; and Aisling McMahon, ‘Brexit and the Unitary 
Patent Package: A Further Compromised Future?’ (2018) 15(2) Scripted 175. 
135 Ohly and Streinz, 258. 
136 UK Government News Story, ‘UK ratifies the Unified Patent Court Agreement’ available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-ratifies-the-unified-patent-court-agreement> accessed 27 September 2018. 
 22 
 Examining the Ohly and Streinz study, which considers a situation in which the UK ratifies the 
UPCA, the most relevant point for this article is their claim that the UK ‘will not have to accept the 
supremacy of EU law or the possibility of preliminary references from the UPC to the CJEU by 
separate agreement’.137 It seems clear that only the divisions of the UPC that would exist in the UK 
would be bound by EU law. These divisions are not UK courts, they are divisions of the Court of First 
Instance of the UPC. For example, the UK local division/s, as well as the London based central 
division, are a part of the UPC Court of First Instance. They therefore owe obligation to the UPCA 
and as Ohly and Streinz remind, the cooperation between the UPC and the CJEU is as a result of the 
UPCA, not EU law.138 It can be concluded from these points that the divisions of the UPC that would 
exist in London could continue to operate once the UK leave the EU and would have to consider 
decisions of the CJEU.  
However, the remaining national courts in the UK would no longer need to refer questions to 
the CJEU as EU law would no longer apply in that way – this would also be the case for the Biotech 
Directive and SPC Regulations mentioned above, for example. However, a related point here is that 
the UK might still have to consider judgments from the CJEU on matters relating to the Biotech 
Directive given the Directive’s provisions being incorporated into the Implementing Regulations of 
the EPC and the UK’s continued membership of the EPC.  
However, this paper argues for the first time that the UK national courts, whether or not they 
would remain bound by CJEU decisions in this area, should still view the judgements of the CJEU on 
patent law as a persuasive authority (at least) given the benefits of a harmonised European patent 
system; a benefit that UK courts deciding on patent law cases strive for in current practice.139 
This recommendation is even more powerful when considering that the substantive patent law 
provisions that the CJEU could potentially rule on (contained in the UPCA) are akin to the provisions 
implemented into many individual countries national patent laws (including the UK) as a result of the 
un-ratified Community Patent Convention.140  
In the same way that national courts currently see the rulings of the Boards of Appeal of the 
European Patent Office as persuasive,141 that practice could emerge with the judgments of the CJEU. 
This could also be encouraged in non-participating Member States such as Spain, who could view any 
decisions of the CJEU on the UPP as persuasive, as well as decisions from the UPC. Although not an 
ideal situation, it would be for the benefit of harmonisation if the proposed system enters into force. 
In this way, the CJEU would continue to have a role over all aspects of patent law in the UK. 
Against this suggestion for the UK, however, is the political reality that the UK government 
want nothing to do with the CJEU.142 However, in this suggested scenario, judgments would not be 
binding on the UK, but of persuasive authority only. Thus, if there were a situation in which there was 
a serious disagreement on interpretation or outcome, the UK court would not have to implement that 
interpretation or decision (in its national courts). This would also fit with current practice as the UK 
currently do the same with decisions of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO.143  
It is important to note here, that the EU may nevertheless insist that the answers from referrals 
to the CJEU will be binding on the UK as members of the UPCA.144 This suggested approach would 
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therefore require great flexibility from the EU. On the other hand, in spite of the staunch objection to 
the involvement of the CJEU, given the benefits of a unified patent system, the UK may accept the 
patent policy of the EU so that it can remain in the proposed unitary patent system. Again, this will 
come down to politics.145 
Despite the persuasiveness of the Ohly and Streinz study and others, the Max Plank Institute 
published a comprehensive study on the implications of Brexit on unitary patent protection and argued 
that continued participation by the UK would be undesirable.146 In it, Matthias Lamping and Hanns 
Ullrich argue that the extension of unitary protection to the UK is outside the objective of unitary 
patent protection and would cause numerous issues, such as frustrating the UK’s sovereign interests 
and affecting the EU’s autonomy.147 They also state that the continued UK participation in the UPCA 
is not possible due to a lack of legal basis in relation to courts outside the EU legal order cooperating 
with the CJEU, that third countries would have a say in UPC policy including Union law and policies, 
and the different principles that will be applied in the interpretation of the UPC.148 In this study, 
participation is deemed to be against the objectives of the project and undesirable because of the 
implications it will have.  
The points made are compelling, however, whether the UK remains a part of the proposed 
unitary patent system will come down to the political situation. If it wants to stay in the system there 
are ways it can do so, as long as it accepts that the CJEU will have a role to play in at least the UK 
based divisions of the UPC. 
Relevantly, in September 2018 the UK government released a guidance note on the 
implications of a ‘no deal Brexit’ on the UPP. It was stated that the ‘UK will explore whether it would 
be possible to remain within the Unified Patent Court and unitary patent systems in a ‘no deal’ 
scenario’.149 The note also pointed out some potential implications if the UK were to have to withdraw 
from the UPP, which implies that this could be a real possibility. Rather than clarify matters, this note 
leaves the situation uncertain. 
If it is decided that the UK will/must withdraw from the UPP, the suggestion above regarding 
persuasive authority can still apply if the UPP goes forward. The UK will still participate in the 
discussion of European patent law, given its continued membership of the EPC. Even outside the EU 
and the UPP, it can and would continue to deliver authoritative decisions on patent law, and it is 
suggested that it should and will continue to take decisions from other jurisdictions, including the 
CJEU, into account.  
A final question must also be asked at this point as to whether or not making any concessions 
would be beneficial to the proposed system, which has already faced severe criticism for not being 
entirely complete, and further fragmenting the system that it attempting to integrate. Instead, Jaeger 
and McMahon suggest that this opportunity should be taken to redraft/reconfigure the UPP to ensure 
that it is as fully fledged and inclusive as it can be.150 Whether or not the UPP enters into force, with 
or without the UK, an opportunity could be taken to make the unitary patent system more inclusive 
and have a wider impact on the European patent system.  
For example, if the UPP goes ahead with the UK, perhaps other non-EU Member States, such 
as Switzerland, could also join. If it does not or cannot go ahead, the package could be renegotiated to 
be more inclusive and thus truly unitary. 
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relevant case law of the CJEU with regard to the Withdrawal Agreement following the transitional period and so the 
CJEU will not be cut out of the UK completely. 
146 Lamping and Ullrich 2018. 
147 Lamping and Ullrich 2018, 18. 
148 Lamping and Ullrich 2018, 20. 
149 UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, ‘Guidance: Patents if there’s no Brexit deal’, 24 September 
2018, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/patents-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/patents-if-theres-no-
brexit-deal> accessed 27 September 2018. 
150 Jaeger, 2016; McMahon, 2018. 
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Ideally, this suggestion should be taken on board. However, in October 2018, Kevin Mooney 
(who has been heavily involved in the UPP) and Stephen Jones (current President of the Chartered 
Institute of Patent Attorneys) gave evidence to the House of Lords on the effect of Brexit on the UPP.151 
The presentation focussed on how to make the system work despite the potential issues discussed 
above, and particularly with regard to the transitional period of Brexit or a no deal Brexit. This 
indicates the strong desire for the UK to remain a part of the UPP with Mooney also stating that ‘there 
is the political will to do it’ basing that opinion on the recent guidance note mentioned above and the 
decision to ratify the UPCA.152 It may therefore be the case that the UPP is implemented by all means 
necessary, despite what it ends up as and that reality should be prepared for. 
From the examination of the continued participation of the UK in the UPP it is argued that in 
the case that the UPP goes ahead with the UK involved, which appears to be the intention of the UK 
and more importantly possible, the CJEU should continue to play a role in European patent law, and 
in most potential cases it will. Overall, there should be a greater involvement of the CJEU in the UPP 
and patent law generally to ensure a harmonised European patent system, but also one that takes 
societal concerns into account. 
 
6. The way forward: a hypothetical scenario 
 
The next potential change in the European patent system is the UPP. Standing in the way of that system 
and set to have an impact on the development of a harmonised patent system is Brexit. Each of these 
developments have threatened/threaten the role of the CJEU in patent law matters. It was therefore 
necessary to determine whether the three were (ir)reconcilable. 
As has been shown, in general, in order to develop a more efficient and effective European 
patent system the role of the CJEU is essential. This is for two reasons: first, its generalist overview 
which ensures that matters outside the patent system are taken into account, such as fundamental rights; 
and second, its harmonising effect on EU patent law interpretation. The constant threat to the role of 
the CJEU over patent law goes against the development of such a system. 
 In the lead up to the finalisation of the UPP, the CJEU played a key role in ensuring its 
compatibility with EU law and thus its viability. However, attempts were then made to restrict the role 
of the CJEU over the substantive patent law contained therein. Politics aside, one of the reasons behind 
such attempts was due to the controversial case law that the CJEU has handed down on patent law 
matters.  
In relation to SPCs and biotechnological inventions, the decisions of the CJEU have been 
criticised for being confusing and for going too far. However, external factors (vague laws and 
incorrect scientific evidence) had an impact on those controversial decisions. Nevertheless, a distrust 
remains regarding the CJEU given its generalist nature. Criticisms suggest that a specialist court is 
necessary for making decisions on patent law given the technical nature of the subject. 
However, despite the results of CJEU decisions thus far, maintaining its generalist nature is 
essential in patent law to ensure that wider societal concerns are taken into account. When it comes to 
patent law, there exists a risk that in the spirit of innovation and further development, fundamental 
rights and values may not be given full consideration. If that were to become a reality, the resultant 
patent system would not be as effective because it would be ignoring these important factors. The 
CJEU will likely retain its role in the new system and importantly, over relevant substantive patent 
law.  
Brexit may also have an impact on the role of the CJEU as a harmonising agent in the European 
patent system. Once the UK leaves the EU, whether it remains in the UPP will come down to political 
realities. If it does stay in the UPP, UPC divisions in the UK will have to consider the case law of the 
                                                        
151 EU Justice Sub-Committee Recording available at: <https://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/123eb9d5-2500-47c6-bd9f-
ee54fd1784f1> accessed 11 November 2018. 
152 EU Justice Sub-Committee Recording, at 11:27:41. 
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CJEU on the relevant laws. However, it is not clear whether UK national courts will have to do the 
same. If they do not take CJEU jurisprudence into account, this could result in areas of divergence in 
the interpretation of patent law between the UK and EU Member States that follow CJEU rulings. This 
would go against the long standing goal of a harmonised European patent system (especially one that 
goes beyond the EU) and would have an impact on its efficiency.  
In an ideal scenario, the opportunity would be taken to renegotiate the proposed unitary patent 
system so that it would be more inclusive. However, it seems as though all attempts are being made to 
make the current iteration work with the UK remaining involved post-Brexit. To prepare for that 
situation, it is suggested that national courts in the UK should consider the rulings of the CJEU (and 
the UPC) as persuasive and consider the reasonings of the Court in their decisions on similar matters. 
In doing so, a harmonised approach can still emerge. By implementing this suggestion, the UPP, the 
CJEU and Brexit could be reconciled. Therefore, in the event that this system goes ahead and the UK 
leaves the EU, the patent system could still move forward.  
Given the hypothetical nature of this suggestion, it is useful to consider how it could work in 
practice. Two questions must be considered in this example: one, the necessary nature of the role of 
the CJEU in considering the wider societal implications of patent law decisions; and two, the impact 
of Brexit on harmonisation in the European patent system. 
 Take for example a hypothetical invention relating to processes for cloning human organs. 
Under Schedule 2A of the Patent Act 1977 (UK), Article 6 of the Biotech Directive, and Rule 28 of 
the EPC, ‘processes for cloning human beings’ are excluded from patentability. The reason behind this 
exception is due to concerns with eugenics. This exception does not however specify whether 
processes for cloning human organs would also be an exception to patentability. Given developments 
in technology, it is relevant to consider possible advances and the implications that could result. 
 If an inventor were to apply to the EPO for a patent on this process for cloning human organs, 
given the narrow interpretation that is often implemented by the EPO when it comes to exclusions and 
exceptions to patentability, it may be the case that a patent is granted on that invention as it is not 
specifically a process for cloning a human being. It also may not fall under the general morality 
provision in Article 53 EPC as that would require the existence of an overwhelming consensus against 
such an invention.  
However, it would also be likely that either an opposition action would be taken before the 
EPO, or a national court action could be raised in an attempt to have the patent revoked if granted 
based on questions of morality. In the latter case, given there is an exception to ‘processes for cloning 
human beings’ it may not be clear if ‘processes for cloning human organs’ would fall within that 
exception. As the provision exists in the Biotech Directive, an EU Member State might have to refer 
this question of interpretation to the CJEU.  
 In this case, the decision of the CJEU would be essential. Given its generalist expertise and its 
concern with the wider societal implications of patent law decisions, it may consider that ‘processes 
for cloning human organs’ should fall under the specific exception or the general exception on morality 
given similar concerns with eugenics, for example. 
 If that were the case, all relevant national courts would have to take that decision into 
account.153 Furthermore, a UPC division could also request an opinion on this matter from the CJEU 
and in that case, all UPC divisions would also have to take that decision into account (including the 
UK divisions). Even if the UPC had not requested an opinion, it would be advisable that they take the 
CJEU decision into account. The result would be the wide-spread consideration of a decision that has 
been made taking into account the wider implications of technological developments and thus, a 
harmonised approach to this issue.  
                                                        
153 In this specific scenario, the EPO Boards of Appeal could also consider the decision of the CJEU given the provisions 
of the Biotech Directive have been incorporated into the EPC Implementing Regulations. 
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 However, once the UK leaves the EU, national courts may not have to take CJEU decisions on 
patent law matters into account. If that were the case in this scenario, the UK may take a different 
approach to the patentability of processes for cloning human organs. As a result, divergence in 
interpretations could emerge, not just in this hypothetical scenario, but in the event of any CJEU 
referral. This would go against the long-standing goal of a harmonised European patent system.  
On the other hand, if the UK national courts saw CJEU decisions as a persuasive authority and 
considered its reasoning sound, there would be no reason for the UK national court to detract from that 
interpretation. This also leaves room for the UK national court to disagree with the reasoning of the 
CJEU and to put forward an interpretation that they favour from a moral standpoint. 
Overall, it can be seen that this suggestion could have the effect of promoting harmonisation 
in the European patent system in the numerous situations that could emerge in future, for example if 
the UPP is implemented and/or post-Brexit. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the situation regarding the UPP and the CJEU has been and continues to be a complicated 
one. Significantly adding to the complication was the decision of the UK to leave the EU and then to 
ratify the UPCA. The continued questioning of the role of the CJEU goes against the overarching goal 
of a harmonised patent system that still considers the wider implications of its decisions. It was 
therefore necessary to examine in detail the role of the CJEU and whether the UPP, the CJEU and 
Brexit are (ir)reconcilable from this institutional perspective. 
From the initial development of the UPP, the CJEU has had a say. Not only has it had a say, it 
has been instrumental in the shaping of the UPCA through Opinion 1/09 and has examined the 
Regulations in detail to ensure their legality in Cases C-274/11, C-295/11, C-146/13, and C-147/13. 
However, attempts have also been made to limit its jurisdiction.  
Yes, the CJEU currently has a poor record in patent law but limiting its jurisdiction in the area 
may result in unforeseen legal and societal consequences. Despite the poor record, which has been 
qualified by external factors, the CJEU should still have a place in the patent system by having a 
generalist overview, ensuring that all factors and fundamental rights are taken into consideration when 
determining patent law matters. Adding to that argument is the resulting harmonising nature of CJEU 
decisions. 
It is also clear that despite the attempts to keep it out, the CJEU could retain jurisdiction over 
the provisions of the UPCA through an incorporating referral in Article 5 Regulation 1257. Its 
decisions will entirely depend on the questions that it is referred but it is likely that it will have a say 
in the matter if it so chooses. 
When adding the question of Brexit, the situation becomes even more complicated. Although 
previous attempts to limit the role of the CJEU have failed, Brexit could limit its harmonising role over 
patent law in the UK. However, the UK have now ratified the UPCA, and as concluded, the CJEU will 
likely have a say in the interpretation of the entire UPP. A question was asked as to whether the UK 
would have to take CJEU decisions into account post-Brexit. The end result will depend significantly 
on the political reality of the situation from both a UK and EU point of view.  
However, despite the uncertainty surrounding the continued participation of the UK in the UPP 
and the role of the CJEU, it has been argued for the first time in this paper that in either scenario, 
decisions of relevant courts (including the CJEU) can and should be taken into account by the UK 
courts to ensure an effective and efficient European patent system. If the UK remains in the UPP, 
decisions of the UPC and the CJEU will have to be taken into account by the divisions of the UPC in 
the UK. Furthermore, in relation to national courts, just as they currently see the decisions of the 
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office as persuasive, so too could they see decisions of the 
CJEU and UPC. Finally, if the UK withdraws from the UPP, decisions from other courts can remain 
persuasive. 
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By doing so, the long-standing goal of an effective and efficient, harmonised European patent 
system will come closer, with or without the UK in the EU or the UPP. As a result, and although 
perhaps it is not the most ideal scenario, it can be argued that the UPP, CJEU and Brexit are 
reconcilable. 
